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Urban outputs often scale superlinearly with city population. A difficulty in understanding the mechanism
of this phenomenon is that different outputs differ considerably in their scaling behaviors. Here, we formulate
a physics-based model for the origin of superlinear scaling in urban outputs by treating human interaction as a
random process. Our model suggests that the increased likelihood of finding required collaborations in a larger
population can explain this superlinear scaling, which our model predicts to be non-power-law. Moreover, the
extent of superlinearity should be greater for activities that require more collaborators. We test this model using
a novel dataset for seven crime types and find strong support.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physics-based models for human processes have had re-
markable success in recent years, perhaps due to the increas-
ing availability of relevant quantitative data (see, e.g., models
of pedestrian synchrony, crowd dynamics, migration patterns,
community formation, even changing religious affiliation [1–
8]). Here we explore the sociophysics of human productivity,
focusing in particular on the origin of superlinear scaling laws
that have been observed for a wide range of urban outputs
(see Fig. 1A for several examples). Increases in these outputs
can be mostly beneficial, as with GDP and patents, or mostly
harmful, as with crime or contagious disease [9–13].
The scaling of serious crime was previously reported to be
superlinear [10, 14] with a power law exponent of approx-
imately 1.16. When we break down the data and compare
across the seven FBI crime report categories1, however, the
scaling behavior varies significantly: some categories show
approximately linear scaling, while others are strongly super-
linear. These differences persist for all years since 1999, the
earliest year for which data are available (see Fig. 2). One
illustrative example is the comparison between robbery and
rape, as shown in Fig. 1B. Robbery scales superlinearly with
city size, while rape scales close to linearly2.
It has remained unclear why some quantities are affected
by city population more than others: previous efforts at un-
derstanding superlinear scaling in urban outputs have largely
focused on the similarities rather than differences [14–18]. In
addition, many models [14, 16–19] rely on a power law as-
sumption for the scaling behaviors, which was recently chal-
lenged [20].
Explaining the variations in the scaling behavior and for-
mulating a non-power-law framework are now two significant
∗ E-mail me at: vcy@u.northwestern.edu
1 FBI crime categories are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, bur-
glary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
2 Note that, for convenience, we frequently use the simpler but more ambigu-
ous term “city” to refer to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) through-
out this manuscript.
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FIG. 1. Urban outputs versus city size. (A) Number of new patents,
murder cases, and AIDS cases in U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA’s) vs. population. These three urban outputs exhibit superlin-
ear scaling—as MSA population doubles, the amount of output more
than doubles. (B) Number of robbery cases and rape cases vs. MSA
population. Robbery scales superlinearly, while rape scales close to
linearly. All data are scaled to have maximum value 1.
challenges in developing a scientific understanding of urban
scaling. Here, we propose a novel model that explains and
predicts the variation in scaling among different urban out-
puts, without relying on a power law hypothesis.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A. Overview of the mathematical model
Since most urban outputs, such as AIDS infection, patent-
ing, and many types of crime have social components [21–26],
we are motivated to incorporate existing knowledge about so-
cial processes into our model. Mark Granovetter’s landmark
work “The Strength of Weak Ties” [27] argued that weak ties
play an important role in providing information novel to one’s
social network that fosters outputs such as finding a job or
starting a business. Motivated by this and direct empirical evi-
dence for the importance of weak ties in innovation and crime
[28, 29], we base our model on the assumption that finding
the right collaboration is key to human productivity: one must
meet all the necessary collaborators for an output in order to
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2produce. Mathematically, this key concept is expressed as
y(N)∼ NPn[u(N)] , (1)
where y(N) denotes the volume of an urban output (such as
the total number of robbery cases or the number of patents)
for a city with population N. The parameter n is the number
of partners needed for the output, u(N) is the average number
of unique contacts for a person living in the city, and Pn[u(N)]
is the probability of finding all required n collaborators among
u(N) contacts.
Here, we give an overview of the model’s general conclu-
sions, without functional form assumptions. In the next sub-
section, we will first show that Pn’s dependency on u is in the
form of
Pn ∼ un(N) . (2)
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2), we have,
y(N)∼ Nun(N) .
Taking the logarithm of both sides and differentiating with re-
spect to ln(N), we have
β ≡ d ln(y)
d ln(N)
∼ 1+n d ln(u)
d ln(N)
. (3)
Eq. (3) leads to three predictions:
Superlinear scaling. β ≡ d ln(y)/d ln(N) is often inter-
preted as the scaling exponent of y. Eq. (3) predicts that
if d ln(u)/d ln(N) > 0, meaning residents of more populated
cities have more contacts (supported by empirical findings in
[30]), and n > 0, meaning the activity typically requires more
than one participant, then β > 1, giving rise to superlinear
scaling.
Variation in scaling exponents. Eq. (3) shows that β in-
creases with n. For fixed N, β grows linearly with n. Thus
Eq. (3) predicts that urban outputs requiring more participants
should exhibit more pronounced superlinear scaling.
Possibility of non-power-law superlinear scaling. Indi-
viduals in bigger cities have the chance to meet more people,
but cognitive limits (among other things) restrict them to only
interacting with a small subset in a given period [31]. It is thus
plausible for d ln(u)/d ln(N) to decrease for large N. Since the
scaling exponent β in Eq. (3) may depend on N, the result is
superlinear scaling behavior that is not a power law.
Considering typical patterns of collaboration can resolve
the puzzle of why scaling behaviors vary across different ur-
ban outputs. The three predictions above hold for any gen-
eral increasing function of u(N). In the following sections,
we first provide a derivation for Pn(u) ∼ un. Then, in order
to make quantitative predictions and compare the model with
empirical data, we propose one general framework for esti-
mating u(N), derived from treating social interactions as a bi-
ased sampling process.
Derivation for Pn(u)
Among u(N) unique contacts, only a small subset of those
should result in partners for outputs such as crime and inven-
FIG. 2. Superlinear scaling over time. Best-fit exponents (mea-
suring degree of superlinear scaling) for scaling laws, i.e., slopes of
curves such as those in Fig. 1, for all seven FBI crime categories.
The shaded regions show 95% confidence intervals. Exponents can
differ considerably among crime categories, and are consistent over
time.
tions. Whether a contact becomes a partner can depend on
many factors: e.g., possession of a certain skill or establish-
ment of a certain level of trust. We denote this probability by
γ , which differs by the type of activity.
The need to find all required collaborators for an output to
occur can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that the
output requires n partners, each with a unique set of attributes
(e.g., skill, relationship, etc.). The second is that the output re-
quires n individuals each possessing the same set of attributes.
We present calculations for both interpretations and show that
the scaling relationship for Pn, the probability of finding all
partners needed, is Pn ∼ un (to leading order) for both inter-
pretations.
Finding n partners with unique attributes. The probabil-
ity of finding at least one partner with a desired attribute out
of the u people met is
q(u,γi) = 1− (1− γi)u ,
where γi 1 is the probability of any given individual having
the attribute.
After finding one partner among the u individuals met (with
probability q(u,γ1)), then, if n > 1, the searcher also needs to
find another compatible partner among the u− 1 remaining
contacts (with probability q(u−1,γ2)), and so on. The proba-
bility of finding all n partners can be expressed as:
Pn = q(u,γ1) ·q(u−1,γ2) · · ·q(u−n+1,γn) . (4)
We expand (4) assuming γi 1 for all i. Since the expansion
of q(u,γi) near γi = 0 is q(u,γi) ≈ uγi +O(γ2i ), the leading
order term for Pn is:
Pn ∼ u(u−1) · · ·(u−n+1)
n
∏
i=1
γi .
With u n, we have
Pn ∼ un
n
∏
i=1
γi .
Because γi are constants and we are only interested in how
Pn scales with u, we express the scaling relationship as:
Pn ∼ un .
3Finding n partners with the same attributes. The proba-
bility of finding at least n compatible partners with the same
attributes out of the u people met is:
Pn(u) =
u
∑
r=n
(
u
r
)
γr(1− γ)u−r . (5)
where γ is the probability of any person being a suitable part-
ner. This calculation assumes the probability of each person
being a suitable partner is independent.
The leading order term in Eq. (5) is the first term (r = n):
Pn ∼
(
u
n
)
γn(1− γ)u−n = u!γ
n(1− γ)u−n
n!(u−n)! . (6)
We can simplify the ratio of factorials by writing it in terms
of gamma functions:
u!
(u−n)! =
Γ(u+1)
Γ(u−n+1) , (7)
which can then be approximated using Stirling’s approxima-
tion [32]
Γ(z+a)
Γ(z+b)
= za−b
[
1+
(a+b)(a+b−1)
2z
]
for large z and bounded a, b. Setting z = u, a = 1, and b =
1−n, Eq. (6) can be simplified as
Pn ∼ γ
n(1− γ)u−n(2u−n2+n)un−1
2n!
. (8)
Assuming u  n, and retaining only leading order terms
(highest power in u and lowest power in γ), we get
Pn ∼ γnun .
So the leading order scaling behavior of Pn(u) with u is:
Pn(u)∼ un .
Derivation for u(N)
In order to make quantitative predictions, we provide a
framework to estimate the expression u(N). Since an MSA
is defined based on social and economic integration, we ap-
proximate an MSA of population N as a closed system with
respect to social interactions: all people in the city have some
probability of interacting with one another.
Spatial population distribution in cities is a complex prob-
lem on its own, and we wish to avoid assumptions about the
spatial distribution of social interactions. Instead, we consider
a “social space”—a mathematical convenience to simplify our
analysis—using the following approach. For each individual
under consideration, we map all other individuals in the city
to a one-dimensional space in which they are uniformly dis-
tributed and ordered by social distance to the individual under
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FIG. 3. Mapping to social space. Cartoon for individuals in a city
mapped to an one-dimensional space, ordered by rank of probability
of social interaction. The probability of interaction with a particular
peer decreases with position in one-dimensional space x as ρ(x).
consideration (for an illustration, see Fig. 3). A larger dis-
tance implies a smaller probability of interaction. The posi-
tion of an individual in this social space corresponds to his
or her rank based on social distance to (or probability of in-
teraction with) the individual under consideration. We then
treat each social interaction as a sampling process (indepen-
dent and with replacement)—the person under consideration
chooses a person in the social space with whom to interact
with probability density function ρ(x;N), where x is position
in the social space. By definition, ρ is rank-probability distri-
bution, and a non-increasing function of x.3
To simplify calculations, we first consider sampling seg-
ments of social space rather than individuals embedded in it.
We discretise the one-dimensional social space of total length
L into M patches of size ∆x. The ith patch (with center po-
sition xi) is thus chosen with probability ρ(xi)∆x. Taking ns
to be the total number of samplings (interactions) that have
occurred, the expected total unique space sampled, Lu is
Lu = ∆x
M
∑
i=1
[1− (1−ρ(xi)∆x)ns ] . (9)
We denote by Ls = ns∆x the length of total space sampled
with repeated samples counted cumulatively. We can then
rewrite Eq. (9) as
Lu = ∆x
M
∑
i=1
[
1−
(
1− ρ(xi)Ls
ns
)ns ]
. (10)
The Laurent series expansion for (1− c/n)n as n→ ∞ is(
1− c
n
)n
= e−c− c
2e−c
2n
+O
(
1
n2
)
.
Using this expansion, Eq. (10) can be rewritten as
Lu = ∆x
M
∑
i=1
[
1− e−ρ(xi)Ls + ρ(xi)
2L2s
2ns
e−ρ(xi)Ls +O
(
1
n2s
)]
.
3 In taking this “social space” approach, we leave for other work (see, e.g.,
[33] or [34]) the interesting questions of how geographical and social net-
work structure may lead to particular scaling laws ρ(x;N).
4We take the continuum limit ∆x→ 0 and ns→ ∞, and neglect
the O(1/ns) and higher order terms. Using M∆x= L, we have
Lu = lim
∆x→0
∆x
M
∑
i=1
[
1− e−ρ(xi)Ls
]
= M∆x− lim
∆x→0
∆x
M
∑
i=1
e−ρ(xi)Ls . (11)
The second term of Eq. 11 is a Riemann sum. Taking the con-
tinuum limit of Eq. (11) as ∆x→ 0, the sum can be expressed
in terms of an integral. We then have
Lu = L−
∫ L
0
e−ρ(x)Lsdx . (12)
Since the population distribution on the social space is uni-
form, the unique length covered by sampling (Lu) and the cu-
mulative length sampled (Ls) directly correspond to the num-
ber of unique individuals met u and the cumulative number of
samples s respectively. The total length of the rank-space L by
construction corresponds to the total population N. Changing
notation in Eq. (12), we find an expression for the number of
unique individuals met u:
u(N) = N−
∫ N
1
e−ρ(x)sdx , (13)
where s is the amount of sampling made by each individual in
a certain period of time. Here we assume s (reflecting casual
contact interactions) does not change with city population4.
We will estimate its value (assumed universal for simplicity)
by fitting to all available datasets.
B. Closed-form expression for scaling of urban outputs
The closed-form expression for the total output y is thus
y(N)∼ N
(
N−
∫ N
1
e−ρ(x)sdx
)n
. (14)
The parameter s is a measure of social capacity, or the amount
of casual social interaction (including repeated interactions) in
a characteristic time period. For simplicity we make the con-
servative approximation that s is universal for all individuals
(see earlier footnote). The function ρ(x) is a rank-probability
distribution representing the probability of interacting with an
individual at rank x in one’s list of contacts sorted by contact
frequency. Intuitively, ρ(x) can be understood as representing
a social interaction pattern: how often does one interact with
4 We note that little evidence exists for this hypothesis: much work has been
done on friendship and acquaintance networks (e.g., [31, 35] ), but little on
scaling of casual contact or weak tie numbers. We expect our hypothesis
of constant s to be conservative in the sense that, if there is some city size
dependence, presumably s(N) is an increasing function, which would result
in even greater superlinearity than our model currently predicts.
one’s most frequent contact vs. one’s second-most-frequent
contact, third-most-frequent contact, etc. Importantly, it ap-
plies not just to close relationships, but also extends to casual
contacts with whom one may not maintain any relationship;
those are taken as seeds of new collaborations.
Secondary correction
Other authors [36–38] have argued that the incentive to
commit crime drops with city size; we incorporate this effect
as a secondary correction to our model:
y(N)∼ N ·u(N)nN−0.12 (15)
∼ N0.88
(
N−
∫ N
1
e−ρ(x;N)sdx
)n
.
Note that this is simply a shifted version of the model in
Eq. (14), and results reported below stay largely the same with
either version (our theoretical predictions for power law fits
are simply shifted globally by 0.12). See supplementary ma-
terial section 7 for details on this secondary correction.
III. RESULTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Even without assumption on the functional form of ρ(x),
Eq. (13) gives du/dN ≥ 0 [39, see §8]. This implies that in-
dividuals with identical social capacities and social interac-
tion patterns will (on average) meet more unique individuals
in more populated cities. This result is consistent with em-
pirical findings from phone contact networks in a number of
cities [30].
In order to get quantitative predictions, we need to make an
assumption about the form of ρ(x;N). Motivated by obser-
vations of Zipf’s law scaling in a variety of rank distributions
(e.g., word frequency, city population, earthquake magnitudes
[40]), and direct evidence supporting the hypothesis that com-
munication networks (such as emails, phone calls and face-
to-face interactions) have power-law like degree distribution
[41–43], we assume ρ(x) to have the following form:
ρ(x;N) = m(N)x−α , (16)
where m(N) is a normalization factor such that
m(N)
∫ N
1 x
−αdx = 1. We will fit the parameter α when
validating with urban scaling data, and also use an indepen-
dent dataset (the communication patterns in the Enron email
corpus) to check that the parameter found is in a reasonable
range. Note that we also consider other options for the
algebraic form of ρ(x) and find similar results (see [39], §3).
The integral in (13), after plugging in Eq. (16)
can be approximated as an incomplete gamma function
(sm)1/αα−1Γ(−α−1,mN−αs) [39, see §8]. Combining that
with Eq. (15), we reach a closed-form estimate for the scaling
behavior of social output in a city of population N:
y(N)∼ N0.88
[
N− (s m)
1/α
α
Γ
(
− 1
α
,m N−αs
)]n
, (17)
5FIG. 4. Model predictions with data. (A) Number of robbery cases
versus MSA population. (B) Number of rapes cases versus MSA
population. Both for US in 2012. Red solid curves shows model
predictions (not power law), blue dots show data points, and the black
dashed curves are reference lines of unit slope. Our model predicts
superlinear scaling for robbery, and approximately linear scaling for
rape. The difference between the model predictions in (A) and (B) is
a result of the differing average co-offending group sizes. This figure
uses co-offending group size calculated from the NIBRS dataset. The
average group sizes are 1.74 for robbery and 1.29 for rape (group
size is n+ 1). The parameters used in the model’s prediction are
s = 2.63×106 and α = 0.93 (global fit to all types of crimes).
where m = m(N) = (α − 1)/(1 − N1−α) if α 6= 1; m =
1/ ln(N) if α = 1. The parameter n is the typical number of
partners needed for an output. We input this parameter’s value
from data on average co-offending group size in the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).
A. Support from empirical data
Our model agrees well with US FBI data on all seven crime
categories across 14 years; typical comparisons are shown
in Fig. 4 (see [39, §5] for all comparisons) and a summary
is shown in Fig. 5. The model explains not only the ob-
served superlinear scaling for some urban outputs (e.g., rob-
bery in Fig. 4-A), but also close-to-linear scaling in others
(e.g., rape in Fig. 4-B). In Fig. 5 we show the relationship be-
tween the average co-offending group size and the degree of
superlinearity (quantified for ease of comparison by the best
fitting power-law exponent to the scaling relation minus one—
though note that our model does not predict power law scal-
ing). The two panels in Fig. 5 use two independent sources of
data for the co-offending group size—NIBRS in Fig. 5-A and
Chicago Police Department in Fig. 5-B. The Pearson correla-
tion between average co-offending group size and superlinear-
ity in the data is 0.764 (p-value 0.046) in Fig. 5-A, and 0.761
(p-value 0.047) in Fig. 5-B. The Spearman’s rank correlation
is 0.821 (p-value 0.034)in Fig. 5-A and 0.786 (p-value 0.048)
Fig. 5-B.
1. Background on empirical data
Average co-offending group sizes for the seven types of
crimes come from crime reports of two independent sources:
the National Incident-Based Reporting System in 2014 and
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FIG. 5. Superlinearity as a function of average group size for
crimes. Superlinearity is quantified as the exponent of the best-fit
power law minus 1; this is for convenience—our model does not
predict power law scaling. Red solid line shows model prediction.
Vertical error bars in both panels are standard deviation of year-to-
year variation over 1999–2012. In (A), the horizontal error bars are
state-to-state standard deviation in mean group sizes. In (B), the hori-
zontal error bars are standard deviation of year-to-year variation over
1999–2012. Sources: [44–46].
the Chicago Police Department arrest records in 1999-2012
(see [39, §1] for more detail on those sources). Both sources
report incident-level records for a variety of crime types. The
co-offending group size of each incident is defined as the num-
ber of unique offenders reported in that incident. We average
over all incidents of each type to reach the average group size.
The parameter n, the number of partners is calculated by av-
erage group size minus 1. Note that average group sizes vary
only over a small range for our crime data. This is primar-
ily due to inherent limitations in offender reporting: for many
crimes committed by groups, only a subset of the co-offenders
are arrested or listed in crime reports (a single arrestee is the
most common case). Despite this limitation, the data do show
significant and consistent variation in group sizes, but the av-
erage values we use should be interpreted as correlates of,
rather than direct estimates of, true co-offending group sizes.5
To ensure the robustness of our results, we use both sources
for model validation and find support of our prediction from
both data sources.
2. Parameter fitting, model selection, and robustness
When comparing our model to data, we use a total of 98
crime scaling datasets (7 types × 14 years). Two parameters
are assumed to be the same across all datasets, α and s, de-
scribing a social interaction pattern and “social capacity,” re-
spectively. Each dataset has another proportionality constant
5 As long as data-derived co-offending group sizes are monotonically in-
creasing functions of the true co-offending group sizes, we expect correla-
tions between model predictions and data to be preserved.
6that is fitted. We find the values of the two global param-
eters (s and α) by minimizing the sum of the 2-norm error
across all 98 datasets. The parameter n is input from the aver-
age co-offending group size data for each type of crime. The
best fitting global parameter pair was s = 2.6×106, α = 0.93
for the NIBRS dataset, and s = 4.0× 106, α = 0.69 for the
Chicago dataset. Our model performs better than power-law
models (as measured by AIC and BIC [39, see §6]) and has
fewer fitted parameters6, suggesting that our framework may
be valuable for understanding this and similar phenomena.
We note that our model predictions are generally quite ro-
bust to the choice of ρ(x). Any decreasing function ρ(x) will
imply du/dN ≥ 0, leading to the prediction of superlinear-
ity. The predictions are not particularly sensitive to the details
of the particular form of that function—in addition to power
laws, we also tested truncated log normals and a piecewise-
constant function (motivated by the “circle of acquaintance-
ship” concept [47]), with nearly equivalent results ([39, see
§3] for details). To avoid overfitting, we do not attempt to ex-
plore the space of all possible (or all plausible) functions ρ(x),
we choose what we see as the simplest, the power law.
IV. DISCUSSION
Some prior work has attributed superlinear scaling to the
hypothesis of hierarchy in infrastructure and social networks
[14, 16], or differences in population density [15]. Our model
suggests that a simple “finite-size effect,” i.e., limited popula-
tion to sample from in small to midsize cities, could be the key
underlying mechanism. This may at first appear surprising,
since even medium-sized cities in the U.S. include hundreds
of thousands of unique individuals. At a plausible high rate of
100 “sampling events” per day, however, an individual would
have nearly 1.5 million samples after 40 years, more than the
population of all but the largest U.S. cities (though of course
the number of unique individuals met will be far less).
In our model, the finite-size effect reduces as city popula-
tion becomes large: Eq. (1) implies that dy/dN decreases as
N increases, and as N → ∞, dy/dN → 1. Data such as that
shown in Fig. 1 display a reduced slope for the largest cities.
This is consistent with the disappearance of this finite-size ef-
fect at the upper limits of U.S. city size. This suggests that,
with limited resources, populating smaller cities would have
a bigger impact on overall urban productivity than populating
already big ones.
Some authors have taken alternative approaches to scaling
of crime in cities, such as using a Bayesian framework [48] or
looking at empirical connections between crime and other ur-
ban indicators [49]. Others have discussed how urban outputs
such as crime may display long-term memory [50], how tem-
poral clustering relates to crime scaling [13], or how crimes
6 We compare our model with the power law assumption (y = aNb) for each
data set. For k data sets, the power law model requires fitting 2k parameters,
while ours only requires k+2 .
cluster geographically in cities [51]. Our model is not mutu-
ally exclusive with these others. However, most efforts con-
tinue to operate under the assumption of power law scaling.
We hope our work will encourage the study of crime outside
of the power law framework.
In [52, 53], Clauset et al. argue that commonly used sta-
tistical approaches to fitting and testing power laws can be
problematic. Leitao et al. [54] recently examined a variety
of power law models in this context, showing that data were
often inconsistent with models, and that many estimated expo-
nents were not statistically distinguishable from 1. Our model
was partially motivated by the (perhaps) over-dependence on
power law assumptions in the literature. The scaling we pre-
dict could explain poor fits of data to power laws: inferred
exponents would vary with the range of city size.
Depersin and Barthelemy [55], motivated by a longitudi-
nal dataset on traffic congestion in cities, argue that scaling
laws depend not only on population but also on growth his-
tory. Our model could also be generalized to incorporate such
dependency—factors such as group size or social interaction
patterns could show memory effects.
Our model, in agreement with previous models [14, 15],
implies that the dual aspects of cities are not separable:
both positive and negative urban outputs (e.g., inventions and
crimes) share common driving mechanisms rooted in social
interaction. Future research—especially in the study of crime,
law, deviance, and other sources of urban inequality—would
do well to consider how scaling models such as ours might
be further calibrated to capture differences within cities, espe-
cially across neighborhoods or communities.
This paper relies heavily on crime as an example because
of the abundance and quality of data we were able to com-
pile. However, the principle of the model can generalize to
other urban outputs driven by forming collaborations, such
as inventions and starting new businesses. We applied our
model (with the same α and s parameters found by fitting to
the crime data) to patent scaling laws, while extracting em-
pirical average group sizes from patent co-authorship. We
find good agreement between our model and patent scaling
behavior (see [39, see §9] for details). We did not include
the patent group size in the comparison in Fig. 5 because the
rate of under-reporting of group sizes likely differs between
patents and crime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The good agreement between our simple model and data in-
dicates that differences in scaling relationships can indeed re-
sult from differences in the typical number of participants for
an urban output: those outputs that are more “social” in nature
are more strongly affected by city population. In agreement
with previous models [14, 15, 19], we find that a fundamental
driving mechanism of scaling in urban productivity is social
interaction.
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